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The Development of the Law pertaining to the
Contracts of Married Women.
Chapter 1.
INTRODUCTION
Scarcely any other branch of the law has received
so much and so careful attention in the adjuaications of
the courts of both England and America in modern times
as that which relates to the married woman. The princi-
ples which have apparently controlled in the development
of this branch of jurisprudence are those which have been
deemed to be for her protection and welfare and for the
best interests of the family,which she has helped to
create.
It is interesting to note in the decisions of' the
courts, the influence which the growth in civilization
of the English people has had upon the reasoning of the
judges. We find even in the common law courts how en-
croachments, slight at first but continued through
successive generations, have modified to some extent,the
more inequitable provisions of the law of married wonen.
But thd most beneficent tribunal in the early history of
the English speaking people, in remedying faults and amel-
iorating rigorous conditions of firmly established and
unbending principles of law, was the court of Equity;
the rise of which as a system was stranuously opposed by
the common law courts for many centuries and was not fin-
ally recognized as having an equal footing until the
reign of James 11. To this court, then, must we look
to find the real oeginning of the work of the emancipa-
tion of the married woman from the disabilities of cov-
erture.
In the more recent years of the developement of
this law in both England and America, there has been
another agency which has been instrumental in effecting
greater changes since about the middle of the present
century, when its aid was, almost for the first time,
invoked, than had been accomplished during all the cen-
turies gone before. This agency is the legislature;
supreme in England and second only to the people in the
United States.
The sources, then, of the law of married women
from which we shall draw in this examination are, (1)
the common law, (2) equity, (3) legislative enactments.
Chapter 1I.
Doctrine of Identity or Unity.
At common law the wife had no legal existence. Her
identity was merged in that of her husband; she was
under his power and authority; incapable of contracting,
of bringing an action in her own name, or of securing
any standing whatever in any case whe"r it was necessary
to resort to law to have a right enforced; neither
could she enjoy the rents and profits of her real estate;
nor hold or receive personal property, for marriage per
se acted as a transfer to the husband, of choses in poss-
ession immediately and choses in action as soon as re-
duced to possession. The situation has been well
expressed by Schouler ( Domestic Relations Sec. 5 ),
thus "husband and wife are one person and that one is
the huab and."
When the theory of unity originated in England
it is impossible to discover. A careful examination of
the authorities discloses the fact that it did not exist
to the same extent before the Conquest that it did after
that time. Miller says in his "History of the Anglo-
Saxons", that "women could hold and convey land without
the consent of their husbands and also witness deeds and
charters;" and we find a confirmatory statement by
Turner in his History of the Anglo-Saxons, as follows:
"that the Anglo-Saxon ladies both inherited and disposed
of property as they pleased, appears from many instances;
a wife is mentioned who devised land by her will with
the consent of her husband in his lifetime." Still the
very fact that she devised land with the consent of her
husband is evidence that she had not the same recognition
in law as her husband; and a further indication is
found in the manner of forming the marriage relation.
The contract of marriage was, in the Anglo-Saxon
law, similar to contract of sale, not of the person of
the woman but of the guardianship; for women, under
this law, were under the guardianship of some person,
usually of their father, until they were married, then
it. became their husband's right by reason of his having
purchased its The husband as guardian became possessor
with his wife of her property; but neither could with-
out the others consent alienate it; and the husband was
not liable for the wife's debts. But she was not total-
ly disabled. On the contrary, it follows from what has
been stated, that she was able to contract with some
degree of independence; for the existence of debts pre-
supposes the ability to contract them, and if her hus-
band was not liable, her creditors must have been able
to enforce collection of them against her during cover-
ture. We conclude, therefore, that she obtained great-
er recognition during this early period than under the
common law of the later period. However, the exact
state of the law of married women at this time, owing
to the primitive and crude condition of all branches of
the government and the lack of writers to preserve it as
history, must remain largely a matter of speculation.
From what source the theory of unity originated is
equally as much a matter of speculation as the time when
it originated; but one can reach a more logical con-
clusion in the case of the former than of the latter
Until within the last half century, history does
not disclose to us any nation in which the married woman
occupied other than a position of servitude, subordin-
ation or, at least, of legal inferiority, less in degree
as civilization advances. Even among the Romans, where
we find the nearest approach to equality, there were re-
strictions on her ability to contract and alienate her
property. Owing to the small regard for the marriage tie,
which existed among this people, it is not strange that
wives were not placed under greater disability. If one
can judge at this distant day from the records of that
time he is forced to the conclusion that the relation was
entered into rather as a matter of convenience than as
an obligation. For example, Jerome tells us of having
seen a husband bury his twenty second wife and he was
her twenty first husband; and another case is mentioned
where a woman had eight husbands in five years. Even
under this condition of the marital relation, if it can
be so called, the husband was entitled to the use of his
wife's property, though he could neither alienate nor
mortgage it.
Though Blackstone says that "the wife's disabili-
ties are deemed for the most part intended for her pro-
tection and benefit, so great a favorite is the female
sex of the laws of England, it can not be asserted that
the doctrin had its origin in so commendable a purpose.
The most probably theory is that the unity of husband
and wife did not become fully recognized as a matter of
law, until after the introduction of Christianity into
England. The earliest works and decisions indicate
that the idea was obtained from the "inspired word."
An anonymous author of a book entitled "The Lawes Res-
olutions of Woemeda Rights or the Lawes Provisions for
Woeme4," who wrote in th, early part of tht seventeath
century says, "In the second chapter" ( of Genesis )
"Moses declareth and expresseth the creation of woman
which word in good sense signifieth not the woe of man,
as some affirm, but with man; for so in our hasty pro-
nunciation we turn the preposition with to woe or wde,
oftentimes; and so she was ordained to be with man aa
a heIp and a companion, because God saw that it was not
good that man should be alone. Then when God brought
woman to man to be named by him, he found straightway
that she was bone of hia bones, and flesh of his flesh,
giving her a name, testifying she was taken out of man,
and he so pronounced that for her sake man should leave
father and mother and adhere to his wife which should
be with him one."
"Now, because Adam hath so pronounced that man
and wife shall be but one flush, and our law is that a
feoffment be made jointly to John at Stile and to Thomas
Noke and his wife, of three acres of land, that Thomas
and his wife get no more but one acre and a half, quia
una persona, - - - - for th3v are but one person and by
this a married woman perhaps may either doubt whether
she be either none or no more than half a person." In
a case decided in the fifteenth year of Charles 11
(Manby v Scott i Modern Rep. 124 ) Hyde, in the opinion
says; "In the beginning when God created woman an help
meet for man he said "they twain shall be one flesh;'
and thereupon our law says that husband and wife are but
one person in law; presently after the judgnent of God
upon woman was 'thy desire shall be to thy husband, for
thy will shall be subject to thy husband and he shall
rule over thee.' Hereupon our law put the wife sub-
potestate viri and says quod ipsa potestatem sui non
habeat, sed vir suus and she is disabled to make any
grant, contract, or bargain without the allowance or
consent of her husband." The sane idea prevailed
among the Romans. These are evidences which, in the
absence of actual knowledge of the source of the doc-
trine, can not be easily rebutted.
Having the theory of identity or unity established,
how or when it matters not, it becomes necessary to as-
certain to what extent it affects the contracts of mar-
ried woman in law and in equity; and the statutory
changes which have been made in the state of New York.
Chapter 111.
The Contracts of Married Woman at Common Law.
The fiction of unity in the law of married women
was not limited in its application, but, on the contrary,
it was almost absolutely maintained. Cases where it
was not applied were exceptional and comparatively few.
It extended not only to contracts, property and torts,
but it also affected her criminal responsibility by in-
troducing presumptions.
It is fundemental in the law of contracts that
there must be at least two parties to ever-Y contract;
and two parties capable of contracting. Therefore, a
woman under the disability of coverture could not, under
this theorybe a competent party to an agreement. In
contemplation of law she has no existence. It was merged
and lost in that of her husband. Her contracts were
not like most contracts of an infant, voidable only,
but while they remained unexecuted on her part they were
absolutelv void; and as they did not bind her, they
could not be enforced against the party contracting with
her. It is, therefore, evident that coverture was a
greater disability than infancy. The infant could, by
ratification after the disability ceases, make himself
absolutely liable on his contracts; but this the mar-
ried woman could not do; she could only bind herself by
entering into a new contract thereafter. The reason for
this is better understood by adverting to the different
grounds of their disabilities. The former resta upon
the ground that the infant is incapable of contracting
by reason of its immature age, and it is therefore, for
hie protection against fraud, undue influence &c., while
the latter rests upon the legal fiction of identity of
husband and wife and the consequent sole and superior
authority vested in the husoand (Neef v Re&mon 76 M 195)
She could not be bound by her own contracts,
neither was she personally liable on a contract in which
she joined with ber husband; such as a j-romisory note,
a bond under seal, or a covenant in a deed of real pro-
perty; nor could she become a surety either for her
husband or for any other person; nor bind herself in any
manner where it was necessary to resort to a court of
law to enforce the obligation. She was disabled from
alienating her land by deed either by uniting with her
husband or by separate conveyance. The only way in
which she had power to transfer her title or interest in
real estate was by levying a fine or suffering a recov-
ery. Such total incapacity hardly warrants the ex-
pression of Blackstone that the female sex is "so great
a favorite"of the laws of England.
The recognized injustice of this excessive re-
striction led to numerous exceptions. It removed the
disability of coverture in cases where the husband waE
civiliter mortuus. or banished after conviction for some
crime, or where he had of his own accord abjured the
realm. Also a woman who had married an alien residing
in another country, was exempted from this disability.
Another exception may be mentioned, not, however, arising
from any disability of the husband. From an early time
in England a married woman could, with the consent of
her husband either by anteauptial or poanuptial agree-
ment carry on a separate trade or business and contract
in relation thereto; also by the "custom of London" she
had the same privilege without regard the consent of
her husband, and herein she could be arrested and impris-
oned for debt without her husband, and also might be
declared a bankr-'pt.
Chapter IV.
Contracts &f the Married Woman in Equity.
The inflexibility of the common law made it impos-
sible to obtain complete justice in many cases, conse-
quently appeals were often made to the king, who was not
bound by its rigid principles. These cases became so
numerous that the king was obliged to delegate this
authority to the chancellor; and out of this beginning
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grew the Court of Equity which has contributed so largely
to the jurisprudence of the English speaking people.
Although the principles of law are fully recog-
nized, and in certain cases enforced, yet they are not
exclusively considered. Equity has always recognized
the duality of husband and wife for many purposes, and
has enabled the wife to have a separate estate and to
contract with her husband or any other person, or to sue
and be sued in relation thereto. The subject of our
present inquiry is with reference to her ability to
enter into contracts enforceable in the Equity courts.
By the general rules of law applicable to married
women, all contracts entered into between husband and
wife before marriage became extinguished by the matri-
monial union, except that, in the case of a bond given
by the husband to the wife and made payable after the
death of the husband, she might enforce collection of it
out of his estate. But courts of Equity, notwithstand-
ing the maxim that "equity follows the law", will in
certain cases enforce such contracts and give effect to
the intention of the parties as expressed therein.
Nevertheless, contracts made in contemplation of marriage
will not be enforced against the wife as a personal obli-
gation, but only against the property to which such con-
tracts relate. Equity, therefore, recognizes the sep-
arate existence of husband and wife sufficiently to val-
idate the contract; but it acts only upon the thing of
its own creation: to wit, the wife's separate estate.
Anti-nuptial agreements were, however, construed
very strictly and would not be extended by a court of
Equity. For example, an agreement that a wife might
dispose of her personal property ad libitum, unless there
was an expressed intention to extend it to personal
property received after marriage, would only apply to
property which shj had at the time of marriage (Pilking-
ham v Cuthbertson 2 Brown's appeal cases 7 )
The agreement of a married woman made with her
husband after marriage, whereby, she acquired the right
to receive and hold property bequeathed to her, was, in
equity, as binding upon both parties thereto as though
made before marriage. Even when the agreement was
that the husband should give to his wife property to be
held as her separate estate, equity would uphold and en-
force it, if it were not made in fraud of creditors.
But it is probable that this rule did not apply where
he attempted to give her his entire estate.
The separate estate of a married woman might be
settled upon her either orally, if it consisted entirely
of personal property, or by written instrument; and it
might be done either before or after marriage. As a
general rule she might dispose of both real and personal
estate, either by will or otherwise, as though she were
a feme sole, unless there was some restriction in the
instrument by which the estate was created. It was for-
merly doubted whether a wife could dispose of her real
estate where the settlement, trust or power was created
before marriage, but rested only in an agreement between
the husband and wife without the interposition of a trust
In regard to this, Lord Hardwicke said in the case of
Peacock v Monk ( 2 Vesey 191 ); "Agreement for settling
estates to the separate use of the wife on marriage are
very frequent, relating both to real and personal estate.
As to personal; undoubtedly where there is an agreement
between husband and wife before marriage, that the wife
shall have her separate use, either the whole or par-
ticular parts, she may dispose of it by an act in her
life or will. She may do it by either, though nothing
is said of the manner of disposing of it. But there is
a much stronger ground in that case, than there can
be in the case of real estate; because that is to take
effect during the life of the husband; for if the hus-
band survives he is entitled to the whole; and none can
come into a share with the husband on the statute of
distributions. Then, such an agreement binds and bars
the husband, arkd consequently bars everybody. But it
is very different as to real estate; for her real es-
tate will descend to her heir-at-law, and that more or
less beneficially; for the husband may be tenant by the
curtesy, if they have issue, otherwise not. But still
it descends to her heir-at-law. Undoubtedly, on her
marriage, a woman may take such a method that she may
dispose of that real estate from going to the heir-at-law;
that is, she may do it without a fine. But I doubt
whether it can be done but by way of trust or of power
over an use." The doubt which existed in the mind of
Lord Hardwicke seems to have been caused by the different
rules under which the law disposed of her real estate
and personal property; the former descended to her heirs
and the latter was not disposed of according to the
statute of distributions, but went to her husband by
virtue of the right to administer upon her estate, which
was given him by statute Charles 11, 22 and 23; but it
waa said in Wilson v Drake (2 Mod. Rep. 20 ) that "it
was not needed to give the right to husbands, for the
husband and wife are but one person in law and this act
provides 'for the settling intestate estates;' now the
wife can not be said to die intestate, when her husband
(the better half) survives."
This doubt has, however, been removed and the
doctrine was firmly ebtablished in New York by the
decisions in Bradish v Gibbs ( 3 John Ch. 523 ) that,
in such a case, a court of equity will compel tho heir
to convey her real estate to the iperson to whom she has
made disposition, making the heir a trastee of her
donee or vendee until this is done.
Where the power rests upon a postnuptial agreement
between the husband and wife, the situation is different.
It will be upheld in equity as to the husoand, but not
as to others whose legal rights wuuld thereoy be infring-
ed or destroyed. If the husband were legally entitled
to both real and personal property, then it woila mte
no difference whether it was antenuptial or a post-
nuptial agreement; but he is entitled only to the
personal property, as above stated, therefore it is void
as to her real estate only. And this distinction rests
entirely on the change in the legal capacity of the
woman occasioned by marriage.
The English doctrine, prior to modern legislative
enactments, seems to have been that a married woman had
an unlimited power over her separate estate, to mortgage,
charge, or dispose of it; unless restrained by some par-
ticular provision in the instrument creating it. A
particular mode of disposition pointed out in the in-
strument would not, however, prevent the disposition of
it in another manner, unless any other mode was express-
ly prohibited. But the English cases are so contradic-
tory, that it is difficult to determine just what the
settled rule really was. The courts of New York, how-
ever, followed the doctrine stated above in the case of
Jaques vs Trustees M. E. Church ( 17 John, 548 ) and in
subsequent cases until the necessity was taken away by
act of the legislature.
As a corollary to the femt covert's right of
disposition, she may enter into contracts with reference
to her separate estate. At an early period it was
otherwise. The English Courts of Equity for a long time
refused to permit a married woman having a separate es-
tate to contract debts to be charged upon it. But the
injustice of allowing her to enjoy such estate after she
had contracted debts on the faith of it, and the
inconvenience whicei she suffered in not being able to
find credit, when sh-. intended to deal fairly, became
apparent; so that courts finally permitted her to
change her separate estate byr at1orili instrument under
seal. As to the creation of this new power the Chan-
cellor, in the case of Vaughan v Vandergastegen 2 Drew,
179 says; "Although from an early period Courts of Equity
had so far departed from the settled rules of law ,vizft
respect to feme covert, as to admit of property being
settled in trust for her separate use, and had establish-
ed the principle that, with respect to the property so
settled, she should ba considered a feme sole, quoad
the capacity of enjoying and the capacity of disposing
of that property, it is remarkable how long and steady
they refused to grant to her the other capacity of a
feme sole, that of contracting debts. It might very
reasonably be considered that consistency required that
she should have the capacity to the same limited extent
to which she was constituted a feme sole; although to
have extended her capacity of contracting debts beyond
that limit would have been clearly a violation of all
principle. But so deeply were Courts of Equity im-
pressed with the propriety of adhering to the rule of
law by which a married woman is incapable of contracting
debt, that they would not recognize in her the capacity
of doing so at all, not even to the same limited extent
to which they had constituted her a feme sole. After a
time, however, being pressed by the injustice of allow-
ing her, after having deliberately and solemnly entered
into an engagement for the payment of money, to continue
in the enjoyment of her separate property without paying
her creditors, the Courts at first ventured so far as to
hold, that if she made a contract for payment of money
by written instrument with a certain degree of formality
and solemnity, as by a bond under her hand and seal, in
that case the property settled to her separate use should
be made liable to the payment of it. " Still the courts
refused to extend the rule to less formal instrunents.
They were unwilling to regard a bond under seal as a
debt, but invented other reasons to justify the apjlication
of the separate estate to their payment. But once un-
lock the door and some one will find an occasion to
open it. No court can safely intrench itself behind
an unlocked door. One departure in the right direction
leads to another, so, in the course of time, 1,romisory
notes, bills of exchange and finally written instruments
in general were brought under the same rule. It came
to pass, therefore, that to charge the married woman's
separate estate, it was only necessary to ascertain her
intention. The Chancellor in the case of Murray v
Barlee ( 3 Mikl & K 210 ) said, "her intention is re-
garded, and the Court only required to oe satisfied
that she intended to deal with ner separate property.
When she appeared to have done so, the Court held her
to have charged it, and made the trustees answer the
demand thus created against it. "
Chapter V.
Contracts of Mvlarriud Women under the New York Statutes.
As before stated Equity was first in order of
time in abating the rigor of the cormon law applicable
to women under the disability of coverture; and it may
be regarded as the forerunner of the legislation by which
so many changes have been everywhere effected, most of
all perhaps in the state of New York.
Sovereignty is supreme. The legislature of each
state of the American Republic is sovereign, limited
only by its own Constitution, the Constitution of the
United States and the franchise of the people within its
boundaries. It was possible for it to overturn com-
pletely what equity could only evade in certain cases.
Therefore, it must necessarily stand first in the ex-
tent and effectiveness of its work.
This state was, perhaps, in the early years of
its existence the most undeviating follower of the com-
mon law relative to married women; even excepting
them from the operation of statutes, which, otherwise,
by implication might have been held to refer to them.
For example, an act passed in 1787 entitled "An act for
Settling Intestate Estates, proving Wills and granting
Administrations" provided that "This act nor anything
else therein contained respecting the distribution of
intestate estates shall be construed to extend to the
estate of feme coverts that shall die incestate, but
that their husbands may demand and have administration
of their rights, credits and other personal estate, and
recover and enjoy the same as fully ab they might have
done before the passing of this act."
The same session of the legislature also enacted
that a woman covert could not make a valid will or tea-
tament of any lands, tenants or hereditiments or of the
rents, issues and profits therefrom.
As jreviously stated, at common law the wife could
neither by joining with her husband nor by separate in-
strument convey her real estate. The onl- mode in which
she could convey it was by uniting with her husband in
levying a fine; but an act passed in 1801 (R. L. 369)
enabled her to execute a deed, requiring, however, that
she should acknowledge before a projer officer, apart
from her husband that she executed such deed without
fear or compulsion of' her husband. By virtue of this
act the same result was obtained as was formerly accom-
pliahed by a fine; it facilitates, rather then enlarges
her power.
No further act affecting th-. rights of married
womentwas pasaed until the adoltion of the Revised Sut-
utes in 1330. Although by the law of 1787 the married
woman was precluded from making any will of r6al estate,
she still had the right to bequeath her personal property
but this privilege the I Revised Statutes touo away; so
that from 1830 to 1849 she could not dispose by rill of
either real or personal propertyT. This, of course,
did not affect her power of appointment which was ex-
ercised by an instrument in the nature of a will, in
cases where that right wab given her by antenuptial
agreement; and it seems also that, during this period
she could, with the assent of her husband, make a will
of personal property. This distinction was undoubtedly
based upon the ground that, since the husband was the
only person interested in the wife's personal estate, it
was proper to allow her to make a will witia his consent.
By Chapter 80 of the Laws of 1840 the right was
given to the married woman to insure the life of her
husband for her own benefit and to preserve the proceeds
free from the claims of his creditors. This, though but
a slight privilege, marks the beginning of a new era in
her legal status - the recognition of rights never before
known in the laws of England or America.
Chapter 11 of the Laws of 1845 enabled a married
woman to take out a patent on her own invention and to
receive the benefits and profits therefrom, and to trans-
fer and dispose of the same and perform all acts in re-
lation thereto in the same manner as though she were
single.
Although the year 1840 really marks the beginning
of this new era, but slight changes were made prior to
1848. The legislature of that year, by Chapter 200,
Section 1, transformed her equitable into a legal estate
and declared that all property which she should there-
after receive she should hold as her own legal estate,
and the same should not be subject to the claims of the
creditors of her husband.
Section 2 of this act provides that "The real and
personal property, and the rents, issuee and profits
thereof, of any female now married, shal- not be subject
to the disposal of her husband; but shall be her sole
and separate property as if sne were a single female
except so far as the same may be liable for the debts of
her husband heretofore contracted." This section was
held to be unconstitutional for the reason that it at-
tempted to take away the vested right which the husband
had in hi wife's property by virtue of the common law
(White v White, 4 How. Pr., 102)
The third section of this act provides that "It
shall be lawful for any married female to receive by gift,
grant, divise or bequest from any person other than her
husband and hold to her sole and separate use as if she
were a single female, real and personal property, and
the rents, issues and profits thereof, and the same shall
not be subject to the disposal of her husband nor be
liable for his debts."
This act, while it gave her the right to receive
and hold property as a legal estate, did not provide for
any disposition of it; consequently she was under as
great a disability in disposing of it or in making a con-
tract in regard to it, as at any time prior to the pas-
sage of the act. The legislature of 1849 removed the
disability, however, by the enactment of Section 1,
Chapter 375, which provides that "Any married female may
take by inheritance, or by gift, grant, devise or be-
quest from any person other than her husband and hold to
her sole and separate use and convey and devise real and
personal property, and any interest or estate therein,
and the rents, issues and profits thereof, in the same
manner and with like effect as if she were unmarried,
and the same shall not be subject to the disposal of her
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husband nor be liable for his debts;" thus giving her
the additional right to receive property by inheritance,
as well as by gift, grant, divise and bequest, and to
diepose of it ad libitum; the husband not even being
required to join in a deed conveying her real property.
Although the law of 1830, taking away the right of the
married woman to will her personal property, was not
expressly repealed until 1867, the act of 1849 made the
act of 1830 a mere nullity, as it also did the law of
1787 preventing her from mking a will of real estate or
any interest therein, and gave the power to will it as
well as to contract in relation thereto.
But the disability of coverture was removed only
so far as property rights were concerned; neither the
act of 1849 nor any legislation prior thereto, enabled
her to bind herself personally apart therefrom. This
was, accomplished by later legislation.
As before stated, a married woman could carry on
a trade or business; but only with her husband's consent
or by the "custom of London." In this state Chapter 90
of the Laws of 1860 provided that she could do this in
her individual capacity without the consent of her
husband. It also enabled her to perform any labor or
services on her sole and separate account, and to retain
the earnings therefrom as her role and separate estate.
Still she was bound only by contracts relating to such
trade or business.
The third section of this act took a step back-
ward. Since the law of 1849, previously referred to, a
married woman had been able, not only to receive and
hold real and personal property, bout also to dispose of
either or both in whatever manner she pleased; but this
section took away entirel , her right to dispose of her
real estate without the consent of her hu4band. The
object of this retrogressive step was, undoubtedly, the
preservation of his right of crtesy, which now zould
only be lost by his consent, thus placing dower and
curtesy on an equal footing. This section, however,
remained in force but two years. It was then amended by
Section 1 Chapter 172 of the Laws of 1862, which restored
to her the right of disposition and the right to enter
into contracts in relation to her real estate with the
like effect in all respects as if she were unmarried. "
Chapter 300 of the Laws of 1878, Section 1, gave
to a married woman, resident of this state and over
twenty-one years of age, the power to "execute, acknowl-
edge and deliver her power of attorney with like fo rce
and effect, and in the same manner as if she were a
single woman." As she had not been able to contract
generally at that time, she could confer only such power
as she had, viz: the power to contract in relation to
her separate estate or her trade or business.
It was not until 1884 that the old equity rule,
previously adopted by the legislature of this state, was
departed from. Legislation had followed in the foot-
steps of equity in nearly every case, if not invariably.
The legislature of 1884 made an innovation by passing a
law (Chapter 381 Section 1 ) enabling a married woman to
contract "to the same extent, with like effect and in
the same fonm as if unmarried and she and her separate
estate shall be liable thereon, whether such contract
relates to her separate business or estate or otherwise,
and in no case shall a charge upon her separate estate
be necessary. " With but one exception she could now
contract generally and bind herself personally. This
exception was created by the second section of the same
act and reads as follows: "This act shall not affect
nor apply to any contract that shall be made between
husband and wife." Nevertheless she could contract to
the same extent as her husband, so that they were on an
equal footing. But this last restriction was removed
by the Laws of 1892, Chapter 594, which provides that
"A married woman may contract with her husband or any
other person, to the same extent, with like effect, and
in the same form as if unmarried, and she and her separ-
ate estate shall be liable thereon, whether such con-
tract relates to her separate business or estate or
otherwise and in no case shall a charge upon her separ-
ate estate be necessary." This is the last statute to
complete the work of emancipation from disabilities of
coverture.
The truth of the statement, "so great a favorite
is the female sex of the law," can not now be questioned.
The law found the married woman in a condition of legal
subordination to her husband, and has placed her on a
plane of equality with him. Every barrier within the
power of legislation to remove, has disappeared before
its onward progress. She now breaths the air of legal
if not of political liberty. In some things she is
more highly favored than her companion of thtv sterner
sex. She ( also the unmarried woman ) is privileged
from arrest, in many cases where her husoand would be
comnitted to the goal. Her dower in his lands can not
be barred without her consent, while she can dispose of
her real estate and effectually cut off the curtesy
interest to which her husband would otherwise be entitled
The great work of emancipation which has been
accomplished by the New York legislature with the last
fifty years, must always be regarded as one of the best
indications of the civilization of our time. "There is
nothing, I think, which marks more decidedly the character
of men or of nations, than the manner in which they
treat women."
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